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Summary. – Financial openness is often associated with higher rates of economic growth. We
show that the impact of openness on factor productivity growth is more important than the
eﬀect on capital growth. This explains why the growth eﬀects of liberalization appear to be
largely permanent, not temporary. We attribute these permanent liberalization eﬀects to the
role ﬁnancial openness plays in stock market and banking sector development, and to changes in
the quality of institutions. We ﬁnd some indirect evidence of higher investment eﬃciency post-
liberalization. We also document threshold eﬀects: countries that are more ﬁnancially developed
or have higher quality of institutions experience larger productivity growth responses. Finally,
we show that the growth boost from openness outweighs the detrimental loss in growth from
global or regional banking crises.
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Recent evidence strongly suggests a link between ﬁnancial openness and economic
growth. For example, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) and Quinn and Toyoda
(2008) document strong growth eﬀects. However, Rodrik (1998) and Edison, Levine,
Ricci, and Slok (2002) ﬁnd weak eﬀects and a survey paper by Prasad, Rogoﬀ, Wei, and
Kose (2009) calls the collective evidence “mixed.” This debate has largely been settled
by two pieces of evidence. First, Quinn and Toyoda (2008) show that the “weak eﬀects”
are largely driven by measurement error in the ﬁnancial openness variable used in these
studies. Second, some new micro level studies, Gupta and Yuan (2009) at the industry
level and Mitton (2006) at the ﬁrm level, conﬁrm the positive growth eﬀects of stock
market liberalization and ﬁnd them to be stronger than in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad
(2005).
Nevertheless, this evidence generates an important issue. In the standard “neo-
classical” model, a capital market liberalization lowers the cost of capital, thereby in-
ducing additional investment and a temporary growth response. However, the decrease in
the cost of capital appears rather modest (Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Henry (2000)), and
the associated increase in investment is small relative to the large GDP growth increment
(Henry (2003)). Of course, ﬁnancial openness may also directly aﬀect factor productivity,
for example, by spurring ﬁnancial development, promoting better corporate governance,
or signaling higher quality governments (Rajan and Zingales (2003)). Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2006) argue that examining the productivity eﬀects of international ﬁnancial in-
tegration is far more important than considering its investment growth eﬀects, as the
latter have little chance of helping developing countries close the development gap. This
is what we set out to do in this article.
Our ﬁrst task is to decompose the per capita output growth eﬀect into two channels:
changes in factor productivity and investment growth. We ﬁnd that factor productivity is
the more important channel. Our work thereby ﬁlls a gap in the literature regarding the
determinants of factor productivity growth. Much of the extant literature focuses on the
beneﬁcial eﬀects of ﬁnancial development, but part of that link may really be due to ﬁnan-
cial openness (see Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2007) for a related argument).2
1Our results also complement the results in Borenstein et al. (1998), which document that
Foreign Direct Investment improves factor productivity. We also provide a new analysis
of which part of the growth response is temporary and what part is permanent. To shed
more light on the sources of the permanent eﬀect, we examine the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liber-
alization on future ﬁnancial development and the quality of institutions. In related work,
Ferreira and Matos (2008) provide evidence that foreign institutional investors promote
improved corporate governance. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial openness enhances the develop-
ment and eﬃciency of the stock market, the quality of institutions, and macroeconomic
policies, but the results are not fully robust across speciﬁcations.
A simple mechanism for ﬁnancial openness to aﬀect productivity is that it improves
domestic allocative eﬃciency. For example, in Obstfeld’s (1994) model, openness allows
countries to more eﬃciently share risk and invest in the higher expected return, riskier
projects. Again, the existing literature has focused on ﬁnancial development, see e.g.
Fisman and Love (2004) and Wurgler (2000), but not on ﬁnancial openness. Galindo,
Schianterelli and Weiss (2007) show that domestic ﬁnancial liberalization improves the
eﬃciency of investment allocation. Our results suggest that investment is more sensitive
to global growth opportunities in countries that are open to foreign investors. We are
therefore able to generalize the results in, for instance, Chari and Henry (2008), who
show that ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment in a sample of ﬁve countries is correlated with changes
in growth opportunities after stock market liberalization.
We then go on to conduct an extensive interaction analysis examining on which local
conditions lead to the largest investment growth and/or factor productivity growth re-
sponses. This evidence provides a new perspective on the existing work on the threshold
eﬀects in the relation between ﬁnancial integration and growth (see Bekaert, Harvey and
Lundblad (2001, 2005), Edwards (2001), Klein (2003), Prasad et al. (2009)). We ﬁnd that
both ﬁnancial development and the quality of institutions produce positive interaction ef-
fects. This result is reminiscent of recent work on the eﬀects of FDI on economic growth
by Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004) and on FDI and factor productivity
by Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2009), also showing positive interaction eﬀects with
the development of local ﬁnancial markets.
Finally, one often hears the argument that globalization makes countries more suscep-
2tible to ﬁnancial crises.3 We therefore directly examine the interaction between crises and
ﬁnancial liberalization. Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2008) argue that a banking
and currency crisis, such as the Asian crisis in 1997, may be the price to pay for the longer-
term beneﬁts of ﬁnancial openness. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial openness does not signiﬁcantly
increase the incidence of crises and that the output loss of a crisis is far outweighed by
the output gain of ﬁnancial liberalization.
Our results are of interest to the wider debate about the pros and cons of globalization.
Stiglitz (2010) used the recent global crisis to reiterate that the existence of various mar-
ket imperfections (information asymmetry, non-convex technologies, incomplete markets)
may make full global market integration undesirable. However, the conclusions from this
post-Washington consensus (see Fine (2002)) are based on theoretical models, whereas we
report robust empirical results that seem to at least challenge the policy implications of
the new theories. Another important issue in the debate is the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness
on inequality. Wade (2002) argues that globalization may well have contributed to more
inequality within and across countries, and has not served to close the income gap. Be-
cause increases in factor productivity have, at the very least, the potential to contribute
to closing the income gap, we provide some simple empirical evidence regarding this issue
in the conclusion. Financial openness has indeed reduced the income gap between rich
and poor liberalizing countries; but, in fact, overall cross-sectional income dispersion has
increased.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we introduce the data and
the econometric methods used in the study. We then present evidence on the link between
ﬁnancial openness and economic growth, decomposing the growth eﬀect into investment
growth and factor productivity in Section 3. Section 4 investigates threshold eﬀects. Sec-
tion 5 focuses on the interaction between crises and ﬁnancial openness. Some concluding
remarks are oﬀered in the ﬁnal section.
2 OUTPUT GROWTH AND FINANCIAL
LIBERALIZATION
(a) Data
3Our data, spanning the 1980-2006 period and 96 countries, are drawn from a number of
sources detailed in Appendix Table 1. Some summary statistics are provided in Appendix
Table 2. While most variables do not require further explanation here, it is important to
discuss how we measure capital stock and factor productivity growth. The growth in the
capital stock is equal to aggregate real investment less depreciation in the capital stock
divided by the previous year’s capital stock. We build per capita physical capital stocks
using the method described in King and Levine (1993b). We derive an initial estimate
of the capital stock for 1960, assuming each country is at its steady state capital-output
ratio at that time. Then, we use the aggregate real investment series and the perpetual
inventory method with a depreciation rate of 7% to compute the capital stock in later
years. Total factor productivity growth is constructed as in Beck, Levine, and Loayza
(2000). Assuming a capital share of 0.3 for all countries, we calculate productivity growth
as the diﬀerence between the GDP growth rate and 0.3 times the capital stock growth
rate. Several articles have criticized the assumption of a country invariant capital share
(see, for instance, Gollin (2002)). We therefore consider an alternative computation which
uses the country-speciﬁc capital shares for the manufacturing sector reported in Ortega
and Rodriguez (2006), but re-scaled to average 0.35 across countries.
We employ several measures of ﬁnancial openness. First, our capital market openness
variable uses data from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange
Restrictions. There are six categories of restrictions. If any restriction is in place, the
standard indicator takes a value of zero suggesting the capital account is closed. Because
of its coarseness, this variable has been discredited in the literature, see e.g. Eichengreen
(2001). We instead employ Quinn’s (1997) measure of capital account openness (see also
Quinn and Toyoda (2008)). While relying on the same IMF data, Quinn scores each of
these restrictions, separately for capital payments and receipts, on a scale of 0 to 2 (0.5
increments), and then adds the two. Quinn’s system investigates the need for oﬃcial
approval, the likelihood it is granted, and the presence of taxes. It therefore measures the
degree to which the capital account is open. The measure is available for 78 of our 96
countries.
Second, to measure equity market openness, we use the oﬃcial ﬁnancial openness mea-
sure based on Bekaert and Harvey’s (2005) Chronology of Important Economic, Financial
4and Political Events in Emerging Markets. The oﬃcial liberalization measure is an indi-
cator variable that takes the value of one once a country allows foreigners to transact in
the local equity market. The oﬃcial equity market liberalization variable is available for
all 96 countries.
Last, we consider an additional measure of equity market openness, proposed by
Bekaert (1995) and Edison and Warnock (2003), to explore the robustness of our mea-
sured eﬀects to the dating of ﬁnancial liberalization. The equity market openness measure
is a continuous variable that reﬂects the ratio of market capitalization available to foreign
investors divided by the total market capitalization of all domestically listed ﬁrms. For
this measure, a value of zero means the market is segmented to foreigners and a value of
one means that the entire market capitalization is available to foreign investors.
(b) Econometric framework
Deﬁne yi;t as the log growth rate in per capita real GDP, capital stock, or total factor
productivity for country i. Our dependent variable is growth over ﬁve years:
yi;t+5;5 =
1
5
5 ∑
j=1
yi;t+j i = 1,...,N (1)
where N is the number of countries in our sample. Our main panel regression is speciﬁed
as:
yi;t+5;t = βQi;start + γ
′Xi;t + αLibi;t + ϵi;t+5;5 (2)
where Qi;start represents the logarithm of initial per capita real GDP, reset at 5-year inter-
vals (1980, 1985, etc.). In the standard neo-classical framework, the Xi;t variables control
for steady state per capita GDP levels, which may diﬀer across countries. The Qi;start
variable functions as initial GDP and β is the conditional convergence coeﬃcient which is
expected to be negative. When steady-state GDP is raised (e.g. through policy reforms)
above initial GDP, the country will converge towards the higher per capita GDP level.
To maximize the time-series content in our regression, we use overlapping data. We use
a pooled OLS estimate but the reported standard errors reﬂect groupwise heteroskedas-
ticity, SUR eﬀects, and a Newey and West (1987) adjustment with ﬁve lags for serial
correlation (accounting for the over-lapping nature of the data).
5There are two neo-classical channels through which liberalization can aﬀect growth.
First, the ﬂow of capital from capital-rich to capital-poor countries lowers the real inter-
est rate in liberalizing countries, increases investment, and spurs growth. Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2006) suggest that many developing countries are not particularly capital scarce
and that this eﬀect only leads to faster convergence to a too low steady-state per capita
GDP. Second, the international ﬁnance literature suggests that open equity markets re-
duce the equity risk premium because of improved risk sharing. This intuition goes back
to Errunza and Losq (1985) and was tested in Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry
(2000). As the cost of capital decreases, more investment projects should have positive
net present value. This should spur investment that is ﬁnanced either locally or by foreign
capital. The increased investment leads to increased output growth. From the perspective
of the neo-classical model, this improved risk sharing and foreign presence in local capital
markets is bound to raise the steady state level of GDP. If this is the case, accounting
for ﬁnancial openness should imply that the regression framework should control for the
true steady state GDP and the convergence coeﬃcient should increase, a hypothesis we
test below. Nevertheless, the growth spurt remains temporary within the neo-classical
framework.
3 DECOMPOSING THE GROWTH EFFECT OF
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION
(a) The decomposition
Table 1 presents the impact of both capital account openness and oﬃcial equity mar-
ket liberalization on real per capita GDP, capital stock, and total factor productivity
growth. Each regression includes year indicator variables (though these coeﬃcients are
not reported). We include, in addition to initial per capita GDP, four standard control
variables: a human capital measure (secondary school enrollment), the logarithm of life
expectancy (health care), trade openness (exports plus imports divided by GDP), and
private credit to GDP (ﬁnancial development). Note that our factor productivity growth
measure does not account for human capital accumulation. There is a lively debate on
how human capital should be taken into account in growth accounting exercises (see Bils
6and Klenow (2000) and Bosworth and Collins (2003)), which is beyond the scope of this
article. However, we always include human capital as an independent variable in all of
our speciﬁcations.
[Table 1 here]
We begin with an exploration of the GDP growth eﬀects in the left most column of
each group in Table 1. While we concentrate our discussion on the coeﬃcients associated
with the ﬁnancial openness variables, the signs on the other coeﬃcients are consistent with
the previous literature (see Barro (1997a,b) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). The
coeﬃcients on initial GDP are negative and highly signiﬁcant, which is precisely what one
would expect from a conditional convergence interpretation. The coeﬃcients for all the
other variables also have the expected sign and are also statistically signiﬁcant. Turning
to ﬁnancial openness, the coeﬃcients on capital market and equity market openness are
statistically signiﬁcant (both more than four standard errors from zero). The results
suggest openness boosts per capita real GDP growth by an economically meaningful
0.98% to 1.5% per year.
The growth result may be surprising to some given the fact that some well-publicized
articles, such as Rodrik (1998), have found no growth eﬀect associated with general capital
account openness. However, as both Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) and Quinn and
Toyoda (2008) discuss, Rodrik’s result reﬂects the use of the simple 0/1 IMF indicator,
which is too coarse to be a meaningful gauge of the degree of capital market openness. For
our particular sample, using this indicator leads to a coeﬃcient of 0.15% with a standard
error of 0.0014 (results are available upon request). Table 1 helps resolve the mixed
evidence regarding the growth eﬀects of ﬁnancial openness reported by survey articles.
These surveys give undue weight to empirical studies which use a problematic measure of
ﬁnancial openness.4
Table 1 also shows the capital stock and factor productivity growth eﬀects in the two
other sets of columns. We ﬁnd that capital stock growth is signiﬁcantly associated with
both capital account openness and equity market liberalization, even in the presence of a
banking development variable (private credit divided by GDP). In both sets of regressions,
banking development itself is positively and signiﬁcantly associated with higher capital
7stock growth. These results are inconsistent with the results in Beck, Levine and Loayza
(2000), who fail to ﬁnd a direct eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on capital stock growth.
Our results also resolve the critique provided by Henry (2003), who appeals to the
neo-classical growth model to argue that the GDP growth eﬀects of ﬁnancial openness
are ‘too big.’ To review the argument, consider the Solow (1956) growth model:
∆(Y/L) = ∆A + α∆(K/L), (3)
where ∆(Y/L) is the change in the output per worker, ∆(K/L) is the growth in the
capital stock per worker, ∆A is the change in total factor productivity and α is the
growth elasticity to capital inputs, reﬂecting the capital share in output. Using a standard
estimate for α equal to 0.3, the model implies that a capital stock growth eﬀect of 1.2
to 1.7% implies a “neo-classical” growth eﬀect of 35 to 50 basis points across the two
regressions.
Henry (2003) concludes that the growth eﬀects of equity market liberalization reported
in Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) are too large and must be due to measurement
error in the liberalization eﬀect. He suggests that the eﬀect is likely due to equity market
liberalization being correlated with other reforms, such as trade liberalization. However,
such a conclusion seems premature. First, Table 1 controls for trade openness in the
growth regression. Second, when we consider an alternative regression in which we re-
place trade openness with the trade liberalization dates reported in Wacziarg and Welch
(2008), we ﬁnd similar results.5 Third, and most importantly, it is reasonable to expect
that ﬁnancial openness raises factor productivity, as would be reﬂected in ∆A. Given
that the closing of the development gap requires signiﬁcant improvements in factor pro-
ductivity (see Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006)), it is important to test the link between
factor productivity and liberalization directly.
The remaining columns in Table 1 conﬁrm that the eﬀects of capital account openness
and equity market liberalization on factor productivity growth are indeed both large and
statistically signiﬁcant. Decomposing the measured GDP growth eﬀect into the capital
stock and total factor productivity growth eﬀects, nearly two-thirds of the overall GDP
growth eﬀect is attributable to total factor productivity for both measures of ﬁnancial
openness. We also report results for two alternative speciﬁcations. In the fourth column
8in each panel, factor productivity growth is computed using country-speciﬁc capital shares
adapted from Ortega and Rodriguez (2006), which reduces the number of countries in the
sample somewhat. The eﬀect of capital account openness on factor productivity growth
decreases to 67 basis points, and is no longer statistically signiﬁcant; however, in the case
of equity market liberalization, the productivity eﬀect is largely the same as in the case
with a constant capital share. The second additional speciﬁcation, reported in the last few
rows of Table 1, uses 3 year non-overlapping growth data, decomposed into capital stock
growth and factor productivity growth. All the conclusions remain robust, with factor
productivity growth accounting for a slightly larger proportion of the openness eﬀect than
in the main speciﬁcation. In all, our results suggest that factor productivity cannot be
ignored when examining ﬁnancial openness and growth.
In Table 2, we explore the robustness of the ﬁnancial openness eﬀects on GDP, capital
stock, and total factor productivity growth. In the ﬁrst two regressions, we examine
the implications of introducing country-ﬁxed eﬀects (the ﬁxed eﬀects themselves are not
reported to conserve space). Here, we also include a contemporaneous measure of world
GDP growth to control for temporal eﬀects, but do not include other control variables.6 In
both cases, the ﬁnancial openness eﬀects remain large and statistically signiﬁcant. Again,
the bulk of the eﬀect is due to factor productivity gains, and indeed the decomposition
reveals a factor productivity channel that is even stronger when country ﬁxed eﬀects are
included.
[Table 2 here]
In the next two regressions reported in Table 2, we report the results for our alter-
native measure of equity market openness discussed above. The ﬁrst regression repeats
the country-ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation and the second regression repeats the speciﬁcation
including the standard control variable set employed in Table 1. The results, quite simi-
lar to but somewhat weaker than the oﬃcial equity market liberalization eﬀects, buttress
the argument that there exists an important eﬀect for equity market liberalization on
growth, particularly for total factor productivity. To conserve space, we do not employ
this alternative ﬁnancial openness variable further.
Finally, our results are for relatively large samples of countries (96 or 78, depending
9upon the openness measure). In unreported results, we also redo our analysis for a smaller
subset of about 50 countries for which we have better quality data. To provide a sense of
the results, the GDP growth eﬀects in the smaller sample for capital account and equity
market openness are 2.00% and 0.98%, respectively, with a very similar one-third / two-
third split between capital stock and TFP growth.
(b) Endogeneity concerns
One standard critique of a regression framework such as equation (2) is the possibility
of reverse causality: countries liberalize exactly because they are experiencing favorable
growth opportunities. While hard to rule out completely, this criticism seems unfounded.
It is implausible that governments would correctly identify such favorable growth oppor-
tunities and perfectly time the liberalization accordingly. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad
(2005) control for growth opportunities by adding an exogenous growth opportunity mea-
sure to the growth regressions. The measure employs global valuation ratios to capture
the growth opportunities of the industry mix in which the liberalizing country specializes.
Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2007) show that this measure signiﬁcantly predicts
real economic growth in a panel of emerging markets, and is a better measure of growth
opportunities than local valuation ratios. Our results in Tables 1 and 2 are robust to the
addition of this growth opportunities measure.7
Nevertheless, it is still conceivable that governments would push for liberalization be-
cause they recognize the growing need for capital in their economies or that it is exactly
those countries with the right mix of institutions that liberalize. Research on the causes
of ﬁnancial liberalization (see e.g. Quinn and Inclan (1997)) mostly ﬁnds that they are
entirely politically driven.8 It is still possible that the liberalization variable captures ef-
fects of other reforms happening simultaneously. To examine this further, Table 3 reports
results of a panel probit on liberalization. The oﬃcial equity market liberalization is a 0/1
variable already, and we also construct a 0/1 capital account liberalization variable (con-
structed from Quinn’s measure), which we describe in the next section. As independent
variables, we use contemporaneous measures of private credit to GDP, trade to GDP, the
ICRG’s political risk index, and the log of the country credit rating. These variables may
10capture banking, trade, macroeconomic, or other reforms. In both versions of the probit
speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd positive signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for all four variables, suggesting that
the probability of ﬁnancial openness is indeed directly related to other reforms. We then
use the estimated probit to compute a “probability of liberalization” for each country at
each point in time, and use that as an additional control variable.9
[Table 3 here]
We report the coeﬃcients on both the ﬁnancial openness indicator and the ﬁnancial
openness probability in the last two rows of Table 2. The eﬀect of the ﬁnancial openness
indicator is now, at least partially, cleansed of certain reverse causality biases. The ﬁnan-
cial openness eﬀects remain statistically signiﬁcant even in the presence of the probability
of openness variable.
(c) Exploring the neo-classical channels
In the neo-classical model, ﬁnancial integration does not generate a permanent growth
eﬀect. With data extending beyond 2000 and many liberalizations occurring in the late
1980s and early 1990s, we are now able to investigate this implication of the model directly.
Table 4 presents results where we break up the ﬁnancial liberalization eﬀects into two
pieces: years 1 through 5, and years 6 and beyond. We explore these eﬀects for both
capital account and equity market liberalization. While the equity market liberalization
date is known, the date of capital account liberalization is not. To identify the capital
account liberalization date, we deﬁne a liberalization event as an upward increment of 0.2
or larger in Quinn’s openness measure that results in the measure then exceeding 0.5. For
both sets of liberalization dates, fully open countries are associated with the permanent
eﬀect as they are indeed open, by deﬁnition, and have been so for some time. Closed
countries are associated with neither a temporary nor a permanent eﬀect, and receive a
zero.
[Table 4 here]
We report the temporary and permanent eﬀects with both standard controls as em-
ployed in Table 1 and an alternative speciﬁcation that includes country ﬁxed eﬀects as in
Table 2. Across all four speciﬁcations, the GDP growth results suggest that the ﬁnancial
liberalization eﬀect, either the general capital account or the speciﬁc equity market, is
11not a purely temporary phenomenon. The coeﬃcients on the variable representing years
6 and beyond, denoted the permanent eﬀect, is always positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. The eﬀects for capital stock growth are not uniformly signiﬁcant across every
speciﬁcation. Somewhat surprisingly, the temporary capital stock growth eﬀect is not
uniformly stronger than the permanent eﬀect, but it is for equity market liberalization
where identifying permanent and temporary liberalization eﬀects is easier. The perma-
nent factor productivity growth eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant in every case, ranging
between 49 and 147 basis points per annum.
We also consider an alternative speciﬁcation that includes only liberalizing countries
(see the last column of Table 4), that is, countries that undergo the liberalization described
above in our sample. The magnitudes of the temporary eﬀects are similar, and the
permanent eﬀects are even larger in three of the four cases, compared to the full sample
results. Perhaps not surprising, the standard errors increase, but the permanent eﬀect
remains highly signiﬁcant, except in the case of oﬃcial equity market liberalization with
standard controls, where the t-statistic drops to 1.72.
Another implication of the neo-classical model is that controlling for liberalization
should entail a larger conditional convergence coeﬃcient (in absolute terms). That is,
once we control for the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on steady-state per capita GDP, we
should observe stronger conditional convergence (the coeﬃcient on the initial GDP level).
This is indeed what we ﬁnd. To provide a sense of the evidence, the convergence coeﬃ-
cient is -0.0107 for a speciﬁcation without capital account liberalization that is otherwise
identical to one we report in Table 1. The conditional convergence coeﬃcient reported in
Table 1 is -0.0136, substantially larger in absolute magnitude. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant
at the 5% level, suggesting the inclusion of the capital account openness measure is as-
sociated with stronger conditional convergence everything else equal. We observe similar
eﬀects for our equity market openness variables.
(d) Sources of improved factor productivity
In this section, we examine a number of diﬀerent channels through which ﬁnancial
openness may aﬀect factor productivity. We focus primarily on two generally accepted
12sources of long-term growth: ﬁnancial development (Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000))
and institutional quality (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)). We also investigate
some proxies for the quality of macro-economic policies, but these may be correlated with
institutional quality. Our indicators are undoubtedly correlated with what Hall and Jones
(1999) term “social infrastructure” and identify as the main driver of variation in output
per worker across countries.
First, the presence of foreign investors may directly spur ﬁnancial development. For
instance, foreign investor access can improve equity market liquidity and price eﬃciency.
To explore this, we investigate the ﬁnancial openness eﬀects on two standard measures
of stock market liquidity/development, namely the liquidity measure based on zero daily
returns used in Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2007) and equity
market turnover. For general stock market development, we also consider the ratio of
market capitalization to GDP. Finally, we use the measure of price ineﬃciency proposed
in Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000). Financial openness may also eﬀect banking sector devel-
opment. For example, openness may go hand in hand with increased foreign ownership
of domestic banks, which can entail increased access to international ﬁnancial markets,
technological spillovers, increased competition, and improved regulatory oversight. Our
measure for banking development is the standard ratio of private credit to GDP.
Second, we investigate the eﬀects of ﬁnancial openness on institutional quality. Foreign
investors may directly demand better corporate governance, and have associated disciplin-
ing eﬀect on governments. The cost of bad government actions may be more severe when
foreign investors are likely to leave following policy actions that hamper investments and
growth. Conversely, capital controls can provide a screen behind which the government
can channel resources to “favored” ﬁrms and hence, distort resource allocation. Johnson
and Mitton (2003) show how the imposition of capital controls in 1998 increased cronyism
in Malaysia.
To investigate whether ﬁnancial openness improves the quality of institutions, we rely
primarily on data from the International Country Risk Guide (see Appendix Table 1),
a country risk-rating agency. We investigate three measures. First, “investment proﬁle”
measures the general attractiveness of a country for foreign investment and FDI by scoring
contract viability, payment delays, and ability to repatriate capital. It is one sub-category
13from the ICRG’s composite political risk rating. Second, we also use the ICRG’s “law and
order” rating, which is perhaps most directly related to corporate governance. We also
merge three components of the political risk rating, “law and order”, “bureaucratic qual-
ity,” and “corruption” into one “quality of institutions” measure. Finally, we consider the
economic rating from ICRG, as a measure of the quality of macroeconomic policies. The
measure is outcome-based, combining statistics on economic levels and growth, inﬂation,
and ﬁscal and trade balances. To check robustness, we also use Institutional Investor’s
country credit ratings. For all these measures, substantial panel data are available.
It is important to stress that our measures of institutional quality do indeed exhibit
time variation unlike many measures used in the literature. Figure 1 shows the time
evolution of the investment proﬁle measure for ﬁve countries selected as the 10, 25, 50,
75, and 90th percentile countries in the cross-sectional distribution at the outset of our
sample. Not only does this measure indeed ﬂuctuate, but the example shows one country
in which conditions improve (Sweden) and another where conditions rapidly deteriorate
(Zimbabwe).
[Figure 1 here]
The regressions we run are predictive; that is, for the independent variable (a develop-
ment indicator), we use ﬁve-year averages between t and t+5. The potential determinants,
including liberalization, are measured at time t. These regressions face a number of chal-
lenges. First, the independent variables are very persistent, so we include the lagged
dependent variable in each speciﬁcation. Second, we include time eﬀects to potentially
control for a general trend towards ﬁnancial and institutional development. For some of
the variables, we lose a number of countries so that time eﬀects do exhaust many degrees
of freedom. Therefore, we also comment on an alternative speciﬁcation replacing time
eﬀects by one control variable, world GDP growth. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation, including the
lagged independent variable and time eﬀects, is reported on the left-hand side of Table 5.
The speciﬁcation reported in the two columns on the right adds a control variable that
should assuage concerns about reverse causality and simultaneity. Liberalization may
happen in countries with better developed ﬁnancial systems and institutions or coincide
with reforms directly targeting domestic ﬁnancial development and institutions. Given
14that we do not have detailed information on reforms, we use the probit reported in Table 3
to derive a probability of liberalization, which is then added as a control to the regressions
before. Hence, the coeﬃcient on liberalization in the right-hand side of Table 5 can now
be interpreted as the estimated eﬀect of the “exogenous” component of liberalization, not
linked to pure cross-sectional diﬀerences in current levels of development or institutional
quality.
In addition, we have estimated (but do not report) regressions including a measure of
exogenous growth opportunities available to each country constructed in Bekaert, Harvey,
Lundblad, and Siegel (2007). This control variable mitigates the critique of the liberal-
ization being timed to take advantage of unusually favorable growth opportunities (see
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) for a lengthy discussion). The latter speciﬁcation
employs a smaller set of countries given limitations on the growth opportunities variable,
but yields qualitatively similar results to the speciﬁcations reported in Table 4.
[Table 5 here]
We now discuss the results in Table 5. The asterisks on the coeﬃcients in Table 5
indicate that the variable in question is signiﬁcant at the 5% level in a more parsimonious
speciﬁcation where the time eﬀects are replaced by world GDP growth. First, ﬁnancial
openness improves stock market liquidity, as measured by the drop in average zero daily
returns. The coeﬃcients across all speciﬁcations are negative but lack strong statistical
signiﬁcance. However, they become highly signiﬁcant when world GDP growth replaces
time eﬀects. This is true for almost all the stock market development measures. Given
that it is conceivable that there is a general trend towards better developed markets,
not necessarily associated with openness to foreign investors, we should be cautious in
interpreting these results. The ﬁnancial openness eﬀect on turnover is positive as ex-
pected, but loses statistical signiﬁcance once we focus on the exogenous component of
the liberalization. The size of the stock market (measured as the stock market capital-
ization to GDP ratio) also increases post-liberalization but not signiﬁcantly, and once
“endogenous” liberalization is controlled for, the eﬀect weakens further. Price eﬃciency
surprisingly deteriorates after ﬁnancial openness.10
Turning to banking sector development, ﬁnancial openness has a positive and signiﬁ-
15cant eﬀect on private credit to GDP. The results here conﬁrm Chinn and Ito (2006), who
ﬁnd a link between broad capital market openness and measures of ﬁnancial development
in a regression framework that is similar to our ﬁrst speciﬁcation with some additional
controls.
We now turn to our proposed institutional quality measures. Financial openness does
not have a robust eﬀect on our measures of either law and order or the quality of in-
stitutions when the world growth variable is used as a control. However, when we use
time eﬀects, the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant and mostly survive controlling for
“endogenous” liberalization decisions. While not deﬁnitive, this does suggest that the
mere presence of foreign investors may have wider beneﬁcial eﬀects on the institutions
of a country.11 Financial openness also appears to signiﬁcantly predict improvements in
the investment proﬁle, which is narrowly associated with law and regulations beneﬁtting
FDI. The eﬀect disappears for ‘exogenous’ equity liberalization. Finally, ﬁnancial open-
ness is robustly and signiﬁcantly associated with improved macro-policies using both of
our measures, perhaps reﬂecting a disciplining eﬀect of foreign investment. The one ex-
ception again is that the eﬀect disappears for ‘exogenous’ equity liberalization for the ﬁrst
“macro-economic environment” measure.
One interesting hypothesis to help interpret the signiﬁcant factor productivity growth
eﬀects associated with ﬁnancial openness is that ﬁnancial openness may be part of a
‘Great Reversal’ (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) within countries, leading to generally better
policies and institutions. Our results appear consistent with this hypothesis. We not only
ﬁnd direct, ‘exogenous’ positive eﬀects of ﬁnancial openness, but the coeﬃcients on the
probability of liberalization are typically also signiﬁcant, and that variable may indirectly
proxy for simultaneous reforms.
As an additional test, we examine whether factor productivity growth increases through
an improved eﬃciency of capital allocation. In the debate about how ﬁnancial develop-
ment contributes to economic growth, Wurgler (2000) and Fisman and Love (2004)’s work
strongly suggest that ﬁnancial development may improve capital allocation. Beck, Levine
and Loayza (2000) demonstrate that factor productivity is positively related to the ex-
ogenous component of ﬁnancial development. However, Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and
Siegel (2007) show that ﬁnancial openness helps align exogenously available growth op-
16portunities (GO) with actual growth, and that ﬁnancial openness is more important than
either ﬁnancial development or the absence of ﬁnancing constraints, stressed by Rajan and
Zingales (1998). The Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2007) measure of exogenous
growth opportunities essentially uses global valuation ratios for the industries in which a
country specializes, and strongly predicts actual GDP growth. We use their framework
to test whether the response of (aggregate) investment (from t to t + 5) to growth op-
portunities (measured at time t) is diﬀerent in ﬁnancially open economies. Hence, we
are testing an interaction eﬀect: improved domestic allocative eﬃciency would imply that
investment growth responds more strongly to growth opportunities post-liberalization.
[Table 6 here]
Table 6 reports the results. We consider three speciﬁcations each for capital account
openness (top panel) and equity liberalization (bottom panel). The speciﬁcation on the
left is parsimonious. Our regressors include the GO measure, the ﬁnancial openness mea-
sure, and their interaction, in addition to time eﬀects. In this regression, we ﬁnd that
neither growth opportunities nor ﬁnancial openness have an independent eﬀect on capi-
tal stock growth. This is not surprising. The coeﬃcient on growth opportunities simply
reﬂects that in closed economies, global growth opportunities do not lead to additional in-
vestment. Moreover, ﬁnancial openness primarily serves to make countries respond better
to growth opportunities: the interaction coeﬃcients are positive and statistically signiﬁ-
cant. In the second speciﬁcation, we also control for country ﬁxed eﬀects. The interaction
eﬀects remains signiﬁcant, but there is now also an independent eﬀect of capital market
openness on growth. In the third speciﬁcation, we replace the country ﬁxed eﬀects by
the same initial GDP per capita measure used in Table 1, and the eﬀects remain robust,
with now equity openness also generating independent eﬀects. Adding more control vari-
ables does not change these conclusions. Not surprisingly, in all speciﬁcations, investment
growth in closed countries fails to respond to the global growth opportunities available to
their industries.
As a ﬁnal “eﬃciency test,” we examine whether a particular investment to GDP level
generates more growth in ﬁnancially open countries. To do so, we regress ﬁve-year future
growth on initial GDP per capita, year eﬀects, ﬁnancial openness and the investment
17to GDP ratio, where the latter eﬀect is split over “open” and “closed” countries. For
capital account openness, we ﬁnd that each percent of investment to GDP leads to a
signiﬁcantly larger growth response in open relative to closed countries. The increase in
investment eﬃciency is about the same for equity market openness (on the order of 45 to
50 basis points of growth for a 20% investment to GDP ratio), but no longer statistically
signiﬁcant. Detailed results are available upon request.
4 THRESHOLD EFFECTS
Liberalization is associated with both capital stock and factor productivity growth.
However, we only measure an average eﬀect. It is important to examine the heterogeneity
of the eﬀect across diﬀerent countries. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) document
strong threshold eﬀects in the overall GDP growth response to equity market liberaliza-
tion. In exploring the eﬀects of FDI on growth, Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and
Sayek (2004) and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2009) demonstrate positive inter-
actions with the development of local ﬁnancial markets. In Table 7, we investigate the
potential for heterogeneity in the liberalization eﬀects associated with the two growth
channels, for various country characteristics. Panel A focuses on the capital account
openness measure and Panel B on the oﬃcial equity market liberalization.
We measure the heterogeneity across countries in the ﬁnancial openness eﬀect by
breaking up the indicator variable into two pieces:
yi;t+5;t = βQi;start + γ
′Xi;t + αLLib
Low
i;t + αHLib
High
i;t + δChari;t + ϵi;t+5;5, (4)
where yi;t+5;t represents either the ﬁve-year capital stock or total factor productivity
growth, Lib
Low
i;t denotes the openness variable for countries that falls below the median
value for certain country characteristics, and Lib
High
i;t is the analogous deﬁnition for coun-
tries that fall above the median value. The regression also includes the “own-eﬀect” of
the characteristic, which is denoted by Chari;t. We report the coeﬃcients on the high
and low characteristic indicators as well as a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the
coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another. We also report the coeﬃcient
on the own eﬀect.
We estimate a diﬀerent regression for each country characteristic. This approach does
not exploit the continuous nature of the country characteristics measures, and does not
18allow us to extract partial eﬀects from diﬀerent, correlated country characteristics. Un-
fortunately, the various country characteristics are available for diﬀerent sets of countries,
and they are very highly correlated, especially when interaction terms are considered.
This makes a multivariate analysis with continuous interaction eﬀects impossible. In-
stead, our analysis is easy to interpret and does not generate much correlation between
the independent variables.
We consider two categories of interaction variables: ﬁnancial sector variables (pri-
vate credit/GDP, equity market turnover, equity market capitalization/GDP, antidirector
rights, and the price ineﬃciency measure) and quality of institutions variables (the ICRG
quality of institutions measure, the investment proﬁle, law and order, and the country
credit rating). All of these variables are further described in the appendix.
[Table 7 here]
We focus the discussion on the capital account openness measure. The regressions
suggest signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the capital growth regressions with respect to eight of
the nine variables considered. The countries with a ‘high’ level of the characteristic (better
than average ﬁnancial development and better quality institutions) have a signiﬁcantly
higher capital growth response to liberalization than the countries with a ‘low’ level of
the characteristic. For example, the quality of institutions is important for capital stock
growth in both ‘low’ and ‘high’ Quality of Institutions countries. However, the coeﬃcient
is six times larger for countries that have high quality institutions. While this is perhaps
not surprising, it is deﬁnitely conceivable that countries with poor institutions and ﬁnan-
cial development may experience the largest drop in the cost of capital and generate large
investment responses. For one variable, price ineﬃciency, we expect negative direct and
interaction eﬀects. In seven out of nine cases, the direct eﬀect is positive (or negative in
the price ineﬃciency case) and statistically signiﬁcant.
The total factor productivity regressions are also suggestive of heterogeneity; however,
the evidence is somewhat weaker. Similar to the results for capital stock growth, the
coeﬃcients on the ‘high’ level of the variable are generally greater than the coeﬃcients
on the ‘low’ level of the variable (and smaller for the price ineﬃciency variable), and the
high-level coeﬃcients are mostly statistically signiﬁcant. However, the diﬀerence between
19the two coeﬃcients is now only signiﬁcant in seven cases and signiﬁcant at the 1% level
in only three cases. For example, for Quality of Institutions, the coeﬃcient in the ‘low’
countries is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The coeﬃcient for the ‘high’ countries
is signiﬁcant and 11 times greater than the point estimate for the low countries, but the
diﬀerence is only signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The results in Panel B of Table 7 for equity
market liberalization are qualitatively similar, but statistically slightly weaker.
Our analysis shows that the particular characteristics of a country often inﬂuence the
capital stock and factor productivity response to ﬁnancial liberalization. Much more work
is needed to disentangle how such interaction eﬀects really arise. Gupta and Yuan (2009)
provide some perspective on the positive interaction eﬀect with ﬁnancial development for
equity market liberalization using industry data. They ﬁnd that liberalization relaxes
ﬁnancing constraints and stimulates the creation of new ﬁrms only in countries that
are relatively well ﬁnancially developed. They also provide some direct evidence that
regulatory barriers and institutional frictions prevent certain ﬁrms (industries) to take
full advantage of liberalization. It is conceivable that it is simply optimal for countries
not to open up in the early stages of ﬁnancial development, for example, because informal
mechanisms to allocate capital work well at that stage (see, for instance Allen, Qian and
Qian (2005), and Giannetti and Yu (2008)).
5 LIBERALIZATION AND CRISES
An often-heard critique of ﬁnancial liberalization is that it increases the macro-economic
vulnerability of countries and the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis (see Stiglitz (2000)). An
extensive literature on the eﬀects of liberalization on risk sharing and macro-volatility ﬁnds
mixed results (see Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006), Fratzscher and Imbs (2009),
Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003)), although the bulk of the evidence does not support
a strong increase in real volatility post liberalization. Here, we focus on the interaction
between liberalization and banking sector crises. While such crises may not necessarily
lead to a permanent output loss (see Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2008) for an
interesting discussion on the eﬀect of crises on long-term growth), they often lead to a
dramatic temporary output loss. The crisis measure we use is derived from the dates for
banking crises provided by Caprio and Klingebiel (2005). Our results are summarized in
20Table 8.
[Table 8 here]
The ﬁrst exercise we conduct is to simply include the crisis dummy contemporaneously
with the dependent variable in our standard growth regression from Table 1. In Panel A,
the crisis coeﬃcient indicates the average annual loss in GDP growth during a crisis year.
The estimates are around 1% of GDP per year. The inclusion of this variable does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the coeﬃcients associated with ﬁnancial openness. This is inconsistent
with the critique that ﬁnancial liberalizations may take place after a crisis and hence that
the growth eﬀect is biased because of the crisis years occurring just before the reforms.
However, it is still possible that ﬁnancial openness interacts with crises in other ways.
The second set of results also includes an interaction eﬀect between crises and openness.
Interestingly, the results suggest that the output cost of a crisis is larger in open countries.
The eﬀect is largest for capital market openness (estimated to be around 1.5%) but
only borderline signiﬁcant. For equity market liberalization, the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
Nevertheless, it does appear that there may be a cost to liberalizations in the form of
larger crises. However, it is important to realize that the temporary output loss due to
crises is outweighed in our sample by the positive growth eﬀects of liberalization. A crisis
lasts on average 3.5 years, so the estimate of the total output loss of a crisis in a ﬁnancially
open country varies between 6.50% (capital account openness) and 5.88% (equity market
openness). However, the output gain of liberalization is to a certain extent permanent. A
temporary growth spurt after liberalization of about ﬁve years with the per annum eﬀects
reported in Table 8 would suﬃce to oﬀset the output loss induced by a crisis.
These results already suggest that many crises happened post-liberalization. A case
in point is the South-East Asian crisis that happened ﬁve to six years after liberalization
in a number of countries. This raises the possibility that liberalizations cause or help
cause crises. In Panel B, we report the results of a panel probit analysis. The left hand
side variable is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if there is a crisis over
the next ﬁve years. The independent variables are measured at the beginning of the
5-year period. We only include closed or liberalizing countries in this sample, and the
independent variables are the ones employed in the regressions reported in Table 1 plus
21the ICRG political risk index.
We ﬁnd a number of signiﬁcant predictors of a banking sector crisis. First, larger levels
of initial per capita GDP, secondary school enrollment, and life expectancy are all strongly
associated with a reduced probability of a crisis in the capital account speciﬁcation, but
in the equity market speciﬁcation only initial GDP remains signiﬁcant among these vari-
ables. Second, larger scores for ICRG’s political risk index (where larger numbers denote
higher levels of safety) are also signiﬁcantly associated with reduced crisis probabilities.
The second column provides an interpretation of the economic signiﬁcance of the eﬀects
by reporting two speciﬁc predicted crisis probabilities. In particular, we evaluate all the
variables at their medians except the variable in question, which is evaluated at, respec-
tively, the 25% and 75% percentiles in its overall distribution. Clearly, of the explanatory
variables discussed so far, economic development, measured using initial GDP per capita,
generates the largest spread in crisis probabilities.
There are two sets of surprising results that are of considerable interest. First, there
is no reliably signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁnancial openness and the probability of a
banking sector crisis. The point estimates for both measures are negative. For capital
account openness, the coeﬃcient is more than one standard error below zero. An alterna-
tive way to state the result is that capital controls do not help avert crises. This result is
consistent with Glick and Hutchinson’s (2005) analysis of the eﬀect of capital controls on
exchange rate stability, ﬁnding that, if anything, they appear to increase the vulnerability
of economies to speculative attacks.
Second, there is a signiﬁcantly positive relationship between the private credit to GDP
ratio and the probability of a banking sector crisis, which is economically very important
as well.12 Our evidence suggests that high levels of leverage reﬂected in the ratio of private
credit to GDP increases the risk of a crisis. That is, leverage - not openness - is driving
the crisis probabilities.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Our work ﬁts into a growing research area that investigates the link between ﬁnancial
openness (both capital account and equity market) and productivity. We dissect growth
into two channels: capital stock growth and total factor productivity growth. In contrast
22to the work of Bonﬁglioli (2008), we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial openness positively impacts both of
these channels, but has a greater impact on factor productivity than investment. Hence,
we are able to reconcile the relatively large GDP growth response to ﬁnancial openness
and the relatively modest increase in investment. In recent work, Kose et al. (2009) also
ﬁnd a positive eﬀect on productivity. Bonﬁglioli (2008) and Kose et al. (2009) also ﬁnd
productivity eﬀects despite using a coarse measure of capital account openness. We push
the story further, oﬀering three additional insights.
First, we investigate whether the growth eﬀects are permanent or temporary. The neo-
classical model of growth suggests a temporary eﬀect. Our results show both temporary
and permanent eﬀects both in the growth of the capital stock and total factor produc-
tivity. We provide some insights into the channels of these permanent eﬀects, showing
that ﬁnancial openness is associated with future improvements in ﬁnancial development,
institutional quality, and macro-economic policies. These results are mostly, but not al-
ways, robust to controlling for simultaneous reforms, but are somewhat sensitive to how
we control for time eﬀects. This insight seems particularly germane to policy makers
considering regulatory reforms.
Second, we show that both capital stock and productivity growth display heteroge-
neous eﬀects. Intuitively, it does not make sense that all countries respond in the same
fashion to a ﬁnancial liberalization – whether in the capital account or the equity market.
Our analysis shows that the initial country-speciﬁc characteristics of the ﬁnancial sector
and the quality of institutions signiﬁcantly drive the size of the growth response in both
capital stock and factor productivity. The pre-existing environment into which reforms
are introduced is critical.
Finally, we address the currently relevant question of whether ﬁnancial liberalization
is worth it if it renders a country more sensitive to banking crises. When we control
for banking crises, the ﬁnancial openness eﬀect in our growth regression remains robust.
This establishes that recovery from banking crises is not somehow inducing a spurious
relation between openness and growth. More importantly, a panel probit analysis shows
that ﬁnancial openness does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the probability of a banking crisis
(and the point estimates are, in fact, negative). Indeed, our probability of crisis model
points to the leverage that the banking sector employs as a critical determinant of banking
23crises, which we intend to explore in future work.
Our work, together with the mounting micro-oriented evidence as in Chari and Henry
(2008), Gupta and Yuan (2009) and Mitton (2006), is consistent with the notion that
ﬁnancial openness has indeed improved growth prospects for most countries. Ultimately,
ﬁrm-speciﬁc evidence should yield more powerful tests and ﬁner detail on how productivity
is enhanced through openness.
We want to end with an additional “big picture” empirical result. The main reason to
focus on factor productivity growth is Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006)’s observation that
to close the development gap, ﬁnancial openness would have to raise factor productivity.
But, what happened to the development gap during our sample period? In Figure 2, we
provide a tantalizing, but depressing answer. We examine the average GDP per capita
(in logs) of four country groups: countries that never opened, liberalizing countries with
a relatively high GDP per capita in 1980, liberalizing countries with a relatively low
GDP per capita, and countries that were already ﬁnancially open in 1980. We show the
evolution over time of the ratio of per capita GDP of the always open countries to the
per capita GDP of the ﬁrst three groups. We stratify the liberalizing economies in terms
of initial GDP because, as a group, their development level was higher than that of the
always closed countries.
[Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 shows that the income of the low income liberalizing countries is actually lower
than that of the always closed countries. Liberalizing countries as a group have closed
a bit of the gap. On average, the ratio went from 1.51 in 1980 to 1.46 in 2005, where
most of the convergence is actually coming from the lower income countries. However,
the closed countries have diverged: while the open countries were 1.42 times richer in
1980, they are now 1.52 times richer. This evolution also means that liberalization has
in fact contributed to increased cross-sectional dispersion of per capita GDPs, with the
main contributor being the growing divergence between poor, closed countries and open
countries.
We examine the cross-sectional dispersion by estimating the following regression:
Dispt = α0 + α
′
1Xt + ηt (5)
24where Dispt is the cross-sectional variance of log GDP per capita across all countries for
each year. Xt is a vector of explanatory variables including: the time-series variance of
world GDP growth (taken as a rolling ﬁve-year standard deviation of world GDP growth),
the percentage of countries undergoing a banking crisis in that year, the average level of the
trade to GDP ratio, and the spread between the log per capita GDP levels for countries
that are either fully open or fully closed throughout our sample. Finally, to examine
the role for ﬁnancial openness, we include the percentage of countries with either an open
capital account or equity market. Of these potential explanatory variables, only the spread
between GDP per capita for open and closed countries and the level of ﬁnancial openness,
using either measure, are statistically signiﬁcant. Both eﬀects are positive, suggesting
that ﬁnancial openness has indeed contributed to higher cross-sectional income dispersion
over time. In sum, in the parlance of the neo-classical growth theory, the globalization
process has led to some level convergence but also to sigma divergence.
In conclusion, our results on the growth eﬀects are not uniformly positive. We ﬁnd
a near-permanent eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on factor productivity, but, so far, income
levels in liberalizing countries are still far removed from industrialized country levels.
Moreover, the alarming income divergence for the poorest countries poses a huge challenge
for development economics that globalization by itself cannot resolve, especially since we
also document strong threshold eﬀects in Section 4.
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1We appreciate the helpful comments of Xiaoyun Yu, the participants at the Emerging Markets Fi-
nance Conference at City University, London in June 2007, the 2009 McGill Conference on Global Asset
Management, and the 2010 American Finance Association Meeting, two referees, and the editor. Send
correspondence to: Campbell R. Harvey, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708.
Phone: +1 919.660.7768, E-mail: cam.harvey@duke.edu.
2On the link between productivity and ﬁnancial development, see Jeong and Townsend (2007) who
show that total factor productivity growth can come about by ﬁnancial deepening and an expansion
of credit (using data from Thailand); Hsieh and Klenow (2009) who provide micro evidence on capital
mis-allocation in China and India relative to the U.S.; Levine and Zervos (1998) who show that stock
market development improves factor productivity; and Peress (2008) who proposes a model that links
ﬁnancial development and technological progress.
3See, for instance, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
4See also Eichengreen (2001). Unlike Rodrik’s claim, these results remain robust to the inclusion
of institutional quality variables, as we show below. Henry (2007) discusses some other problems with
Rodrik’s empirical approach.
5In the presence of Wacziarg and Welch’s trade liberalization indicator, the capital account and equity
openness eﬀects are somewhat smaller, but are still near 1% per annum and highly statistically signiﬁcant.
The trade liberalization eﬀect itself is statistically signiﬁcant and around 50 to 70 basis points per annum
in magnitude for GDP, capital stock, or total factor productivity growth.
6For our full 96 country sample, the inclusion of both country and time indicators leads to a poorly
behaved variance-covariance matrix given the dimensionality of the system. For this reason, we employ
instead world GDP growth as an alternative control variable for temporal eﬀects.
7We do not report the results to conserve space and because the use of the measure restricts our
sample of countries.
8These concerns are therefore much more valid when de facto, as opposed to de jure, ﬁnancial inte-
gration is considered: capital may ﬂow to “productive” countries.
9We also consider an alternative probit speciﬁcation just for those countries that either liberalize in-
sample or never liberalize. This speciﬁcation is more in line with traditional “treatment” interpretations
used in this literature, and yields similar results.
10Griﬃn, Kelly, and Nardari (2008) discuss how time-variation in this measure is sometimes diﬃcult to
interpret. In contrast, Bailey, Bae, and Mao (2006) show that ﬁnancial openness improves the information
environment. For instance, analyst coverage and value-added by analysts increase with openness, partly
due to the increased presence and activity of foreign analysts.
11For example, Desai and Moel (2008) discuss a particular case where the government of the Czech
Republic compensated a foreign investment unit following signiﬁcant losses associated with poor corporate
governance. More generally, Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009) ﬁnd that foreigners invest less in ﬁrms that
26reside in countries with poor outsider protection, disclosure, and governance. Choi, Lee, and Park (2007)
provide a speciﬁc example of a foreign-ﬁnanced activist fund that directly pushes corporate governance
reforms in Korea.
12Bonﬁglioli (2008) also ﬁnds a positive link between private credit to GDP and crises; she also ﬁnds
a limited role for ﬁnancial liberalization in explaining crises in developed countries.
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31Table 1. Financial openness and growth components
GDP growth
Capital Stock 
Growth
Total Factor 
Productivity
Total Factor 
Productivity 
(Alt.)
GDP growth
Capital Stock 
Growth
Total Factor 
Productivity
Total Factor 
Productivity 
(Alt.)
Number of Countries 78 78 78 67 96 96 96 77
Constant -0.2109 -0.1634 -0.1619 -0.1336 -0.2580 -0.2519 -0.1823 -0.1537
(0.0458) (0.0268) (0.0397) (0.0315) (0.0415) (0.0267) (0.0351) (0.0291)
Initial GDP -0.0136 -0.0149 -0.0091 -0.0063 -0.0111 -0.0132 -0.0071 -0.0057
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Secondary School 0.0315 0.0185 0.0260 0.0220 0.0170 0.0055 0.0154 0.0158
(0.0043) (0.0022) (0.0042) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0030)
Log(Life) 0.0700 0.0663 0.0501 0.0411 0.0796 0.0875 0.0533 0.0461
(0.0122) (0.0081) (0.0103) (0.0082) (0.0115) (0.0081) (0.0095) (0.0079)
Trade/GDP 0.0073 0.0075 0.0051 0.0030 0.0071 0.0083 0.0046 0.0040
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Private credit/GDP 0.0081 0.0122 0.0045 0.0037 0.0045 0.0070 0.0024 0.0018
(0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Financial Openness 0.0150 0.0167 0.0099 0.0067 0.0098 0.0118 0.0063 0.0060
(0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0018)
 Contribution to Growth 33.5% 66.4% 36.2% 63.8%
Financial Openness                 0.0149 0.0147 0.0104 0.0064 0.0117 0.0117 0.0082 0.0079
   (3-year non-overlapping) (0.0057) (0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0022)
 Contribution to Growth 29.7% 69.9% 30.0% 70.1%
Capital Account Openness Official Equity Market Liberalization
The dependent variables are the overlapping five-year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product (GDP), the growth rate of the real capital stock, and total factor productivity growth.  In 
addition to a set of standard control variables and year effects, we report the coefficient on financial openness defined as (1) Quinn’s capital account openness indicator that takes a value between zero and 
one depending upon the intensity of the reported capital account openness and (2) the official liberalization indicator that takes a value of one when the equity market is liberalized, and zero otherwise.  
Given data limitations, the capital account openness regressions include 78 countries and the official equity market liberalization regressions include 96 countries.  The regressions cover 1980-2006.  We 
report coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions. All standard errors (in parentheses) provide a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and account for the overlapping nature of the data.  
The final entries provide alternative estimates based on 3-year non-overlapping observations.  Finally, we include a percentage decomposition of the financial openness effect on GDP growth into capital 
stock accumulation and total factor productivity (it does not sum to 100% due to rounding).  The capital stock component is calculated as 0.3, the assumed capital share, multiplied by the reported financial 
openness effect for capital stock growth.  In the (Alt.) column, the capital share is country-specific.  The total factor productivity component is the reported financial openness effect in the factor 
productivity regression.    
 Table 2. Financial openness and growth components: robustness
GDP growth Capital Stock Growth
Total Factor 
Productivity
Capital Account Openness                     0.0227 0.0123 0.0190
  (Fixed Effects) (0.0039) (0.0024) (0.0040)
Contribution to Growth 16.3% 83.7%
Official Equity Market Liberalization               0.0131 0.0033 0.0122
  (Fixed Effects) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0021)
Contribution to Growth 7.5% 92.5%
Equity Market Openness                0.0136 -0.0006 0.0138
  (Fixed Effects) (0.0030) (0.0017) (0.0029)
Contribution to Growth -1.3% 101.3%
Equity Market Openness                                  0.0085 0.0084 0.0060
 (Standard Controls) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0020)
Contribution to Growth 29.5% 70.5%
Capital Account Openness                     0.0134 0.0129 0.0095
(0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0030)
Probability of Capital Account Openness                     0.0196 0.0237 0.0125
(0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0026)
Equity Market Openness                0.0071 0.0094 0.0043
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0020)
Probability of Equity Market Openness                     0.0243 0.0218 0.0178
(0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0025)
The dependent variables are the overlapping five-year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product (GDP), the growth rate 
of the real capital stock, and total factor productivity growth.  We report the coefficient on financial openness defined as (1) Quinn’s capital 
account openness indicator that takes a value between zero and one depending upon the intensity of the reported capital account openness; 
(2) the official liberalization indicator that takes a value of one when the equity market is liberalized, and zero otherwise; and (3) an 
alternative measure of the degree of equity market openness (investability).  In this table, we consider robustness of the effects reported in 
Table 1 to specifications that instead include country fixed effects and contemporaneous world GDP growth.  To explore robustness to 
alternative measures of financial openness, we also consider the identical specifications employed in Table 1 for equity market openness.  
Given data limitations, the capital account openness regressions include 78 countries and the official equity market liberalization and equity 
market openness regressions include 96 countries. The regressions cover 1980-2006.  We report coefficient estimates from pooled OLS 
regressions. All standard errors (in parentheses) provide a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and account for the overlapping 
nature of the data.  We include a percentage decomposition of the financial openness effect on GDP growth into capital stock accumulation 
and total factor productivity.  Finally, the last two sets of regressions include the predicted probability of capital account (71 countries due to 
the variables needed to estimate the probit) or equity openness (81 countries) based on panel probit regressions of the relevant financial 
openness variables onto the contemporaneous trade/GDP, private credit/GDP, log country credit ratings, and the quality of institutions 
variables (see Table 3). Here, we also report, for comparison, the coefficient and standard error on this predicted probability of financial 
liberalization.  The capital stock component is calculated as 0.3, the assumed capital share, multiplied by the reported financial openness 
effect for capital stock growth.  The total factor productivity component is the reported financial openness effect in the factor productivity 
regression. 
 Table 3. Predicting financial openness
Capital Account 
Openness
Official Equity Market 
Liberalization
Constant -8.6992 -8.2423
(0.9313) (0.7715)
Trade/GDP 3.5194 3.2533
(0.4640) (0.4363)
Private credit/GDP -0.2791 2.6917
(0.4414) (0.3352)
Log(Country Credit Rating) 1.4669 0.8830
(0.2185) (0.1850)
ICRG Quality of Institutions 4.2673 2.3495
(0.6310) (0.4521)
The dependent variable in the panel probit estimation is a 0/1 indicator measuring financial 
openness.   To identify the capital account liberalization dates, we define a liberalization 
event as an upward increment of 0.2 or larger in Quinn's openness measure that results in 
the measure then exceeding 0.5.    For  the official liberalization indicator, the date of 
liberalization is directly employed.  Given data limitations, the capital account openness 
regressions include 71 countries and the official equity market liberalization regressions 
include 81 countries.  Standard errors are provided in parentheses.   
 Table 4. Financial openness and growth components: temporary versus permanent effects
GDP growth Capital Stock Growth
Total Factor 
Productivity
GDP growth 
(liberalizing countries 
only)
Capital Account Openness              
(Standard Controls)
Temporary Effect 0.0045 -0.0025 0.0052 0.0042
(0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0057)
Permanent Effect 0.0125 0.0107 0.0092 0.0164
(0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0059)
Capital Account Openness                    
(Fixed Effects)
Temporary Effect 0.0160 0.0040 0.0149 0.0160
(0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0048)
Permanent Effect 0.0167 0.0065 0.0147 0.0194
(0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0059)
Official Equity Market Liberalization                                
(Standard Controls)
Temporary Effect 0.0139 0.0125 0.0101 0.0154
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0039)
Permanent Effect 0.0079 0.0100 0.0049 0.0093
(0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0055)
Official Equity Market Liberalization           
(Fixed Effects)
Temporary Effect 0.0158 0.0059 0.0140 0.0152
(0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0030)
Permanent Effect 0.0148 0.0019 0.0142 0.0134
(0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0040)
The dependent variables are the overlapping five-year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product (GDP), the growth rate of the real capital stock, and 
total factor productivity growth.  We report temporary and permanent effects from financial openness defined as the first five years after a liberalization event and the six 
plus years beyond, respectively.  Fully open countries are associated with the permanent effect, and closed countries are associated with neither.  For capital account 
openness, we define a liberalization event as an upward increment of 0.2 or larger in Quinn’s openness measure that results in the measure exceeding 0.5.  For the official 
liberalization indicator, the date of liberalization is directly employed.  Given data limitations, the capital account openness regressions include 78 countries and the 
official equity market liberalization regressions include 96 countries. The final column provides alternative estimates for a sample that includes only those countries that 
liberalize in our sample.  The regressions cover 1980-2006.  We report the effects with (1) standard controls and time effects and (2) country fixed effects and the 
contemporaneous world GDP growth rate.  The last column considers the GDP growth effects for a sample restricted to liberalizing countries only (38 or 41 countries, 
respectively, for capital account and equity market liberalization).  We report coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions.  All standard errors (in parentheses) 
provide a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and account for the overlapping nature of the data.   
 Table 5. The effect of financial openness on financial development, institutions, and macro-economic policies
Dependent Variable
Capital Account 
Openness
Official Equity Market 
Liberalization
Capital Account 
Openness                       
(includes probit)
Official Equity Market 
Liberalization                       
(includes probit)
Stock Market Development:
Market Illiquidity                                        -0.0573*  -0.0476*  -0.0769*  -0.0463*
(Log Zero Returns) (0.0544) (0.0353) (0.0564) (0.0360)
0.0392 -0.0046
(0.0453) (0.0352)
[45] [47] [45] [47]
Turnover 0.0762* 0.0702* 0.0558* 0.0424*
(0.0416) (0.0295) (0.0423) (0.0294)
0.0428 0.0627
(0.0317) (0.0229)
[56] [60] [55] [59]
MCAP/GDP 0.0925* 0.0380* 0.0631* -0.0098
(0.0592) (0.0301) (0.0582) (0.0270)
0.1190 0.1704
(0.0272) (0.0282)
[65] [72] [61] [67]
Price Inefficiency 0.0900* 0.0455* 0.0936* 0.0433*
(0.0130) (0.0092) (0.0138) (0.0092)
-0.0067 0.0067
(0.0146) (0.0074)
[44] [46] [44] [46]
Banking Development:
Private Credit 0.0951* 0.0535* 0.0748 0.0264
(0.0172) (0.0107) (0.0152) (0.0097)
0.0813 0.1276
(0.0155) (0.0203)
[78] [96] [71] [81]
Institutions / Corporate Governance:
Investment Profile 0.1164* 0.0340* 0.0947*  -0.0082*
(0.0201) (0.0113) (0.0161) (0.0080)
0.0798 0.1154
(0.0201) (0.0183)
[73] [86] [71] [81]
Quality of Institutions 0.0309 0.0187 0.0316 0.0130
(0.0078) (0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0053)
0.0039 0.0363
(0.0097) (0.0085)
[73] [86] [71] [81]
Law and Order 0.0267 0.0267 0.0295 0.0130
(0.0133) (0.0098) (0.0130) (0.0084)
0.0470 0.0710
(0.0138) (0.0153)
[73] [86] [71] [81]
Macro-economic Environment 0.0294* 0.0143* 0.0247* 0.0001*
(0.0092) (0.0048) (0.0086) (0.0039)
0.0371 0.0499
(0.0074) (0.0086)
[73] [86] [71] [81]
Log Country Credit Rating 0.1210* 0.0511* 0.1298* 0.0440*
(0.0275) (0.0146) (0.0273) (0.0136)
0.0635 0.1235
(0.0190) (0.0207)
[74] [86] [71] [81]
The dependent variable is each regression is provided in the left-most column.  The variables of interest are separated into measures of stock market development, 
banking development, and institutions / corporate governance.  We report the coefficient on financial openness defined as (1) Quinn’s capital account openness 
indicator that takes a value between zero and one depending upon the intensity of the reported capital account openness and (2) the official liberalization indicator that 
takes a value of one when the equity market is liberalized, and zero otherwise.  As controls, we employ the lagged dependent variable, year effects, and in the right-
most columns the predicted probability of capital account or equity liberalization based on panel probit regressions of the relevant financial openness variables onto 
the contemporaneous trade/GDP, private credit/GDP, log country credit ratings, and the quality of institutions variables. For this second set of regressions, we also 
report, for comparison, the coefficient and standard error on this predicted probability of financial liberalization.  The regressions cover 1980-2006.  All standard 
errors (in parentheses) provide a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and account for the overlapping nature of the data.  Given data limitations, the 
number of countries employed differs and is reported below each estimate (in brackets). An asterisk (*) indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant in the 
alternative regression where time effects are replaced by contemporaneous world GDP growth. Table 6. Financial openness and allocative efficiency
year effects
year and 
country 
effects
year effects 
and intial 
GDP
Global Growth Opportunities -0.0233 -0.0106 -0.0137
(0.0148) (0.0087) (0.0139)
Global Growth Opportunities x            0.0302 0.0177 0.0277
   Capital Account Openness (0.0112) (0.0092) (0.0117)
Capital Account Openness -0.0007 0.0161 0.0207
(0.0027) (0.0042) (0.0045)
Global Growth Opportunities -0.0153 -0.0072 -0.0061
(0.0113) (0.0061) (0.0118)
Global Growth Opportunities x               0.0161 0.0135 0.0175
 Official Equity Market Liberalization (0.0077) (0.0054) (0.0088)
Official Equity Market Liberalization 0.0012 -0.0016 0.0076
(0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0030)
The dependent variable is the overlapping five-year average growth rate of real per capita capital stock 
growth.  We report the  coefficients  on  exogenous growth opportunities available to each country, 
financial openness, and their interaction.  In column (1), unreported year effects are also included.  In 
column (2), unreported year and country fixed effects are also included.  Finally, in column (3) 
unreported year effects and the initial level of GDP are also included.  Financial openness is defined as 
(1) Quinn’s capital account openness indicator that takes a value between zero and one depending 
upon the intensity of the reported capital account openness and (2) the official liberalization indicator 
that takes a value of one when the equity market is liberalized, and zero otherwise.  Given data 
limitations on the exogenous growth opportunities measure, the capital account openness regressions 
include 48 countries and the official equity market liberalization regressions include 50 countries. The 
regressions cover 1980-2006.  We report coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions. All 
standard errors (in parentheses) provide a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and account 
for the overlapping nature of the data.  
 from low level from high level Direct effect from low level from high level Direct effect # of countries
Financial Sector:
Private Credit/GDP 0.0141 0.0188 0.0108 ** 0.0058 0.0135 0.0021 *** 78
(0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0018)
Turnover -0.0010 0.0237 0.0089 *** 0.0048 0.0160 0.0033 *** 66
(0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0022) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0017)
MCAP/GDP 0.0143 0.0118 0.0007 0.0090 0.0092 -0.0051 65
(0.0035) (0.0041) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0019)
Antidirector rights -0.0031 0.0102 -0.0104 *** 0.0084 0.0091 0.0118 46
(0.0042) (0.0049) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0037)
Price Inefficiency 0.0028 -0.0098 -0.0023 *** 0.0090 0.0036 0.0092 * 46
(0.0050) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0043)
Institutions:
Quality of Institutions 0.0039 0.0232 0.0090 *** 0.0010 0.0112 0.0193 ** 73
(0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0042) (0.0045)
Investment profile -0.0007 0.0142 0.0356 *** -0.0008 0.0105 0.0134 ** 73
(0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0057)
Law and Order 0.0059 0.0148 0.0177 *** 0.0011 0.0087 0.0161 * 73
(0.0024) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0030)
Log Country Credit Rating -0.0044 0.0181 0.0169 *** 0.0010 0.0183 0.0025 *** 74
(0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0023)
Table 7. Heterogeneity of the capital stock and total factor productivity growth effects
Capital Stock Growth Total Factor Productivity
Panel A: Capital Account Openness
For each interaction variable, we separately conduct regressions that have the five-year average growth rate of the real capital stock and total factor productivity growth as the dependent 
variables. We include in the regressions the same control variables presented in Table 1.  We estimate interaction effects between financial openness and the financial sector and quality of 
institutions variables. We report the associated impact of growth from openness for a country with a low level (below the median of the associated interaction variable) and with a high 
level (above the median of the associated interaction variable).  We also allow for a direct effect on growth associated with the interaction variable.  In Panel A, we report the effect where 
financial openness is defined as Quinn’s capital account openness indicator that takes a value between zero and one depending upon the intensity of the reported capital account openness.  
In Panel B, financial openness is defined as the official liberalization indicator that takes a value of one when the equity market is liberalized, and zero otherwise.  Given data limitations, 
the regressions employ varied numbers of countries which are provided in the right-most column. We report coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions. The regressions cover 
1980-2006.  All standard errors (in parentheses) provide a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and account for the overlapping nature of the data.  Last, we provide the 
significance of a Wald test, for which the null hypothesis is that the high-low effects are equivalent; statistical significance is denoted by a * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1% significance 
levels. Table 7 (continued)
from low level from high level Direct effect from low level from high level Direct effect # of countries
Financial Sector:
Private Credit/GDP 0.0100 0.0131 0.0061 * 0.0011 0.0100 -0.0003 *** 96
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0016)
Turnover 0.0006 0.0119 0.0113 *** 0.0025 0.0078 0.0041 *** 73
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0017)
MCAP/GDP 0.0099 0.0085 0.0005 0.0065 0.0055 -0.0046 73
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Antidirector rights 0.0027 0.0115 -0.0050 *** 0.0071 0.0086 0.0098 47
(0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0023)
Price Inefficiency 0.0082 -0.0021 -0.0007 *** 0.0049 0.0023 0.0077 * 46
(0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0055) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0043)
Institutions:
Quality of Institutions 0.0083 0.0138 0.0083 ** 0.0018 0.0064 0.0164 86
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0044)
Investment profile 0.0010 0.0149 0.0327 *** -0.0013 0.0086 0.0155 *** 86
(0.0011) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0053)
Law and Order 0.0094 0.0115 0.0134 0.0030 0.0062 0.0136 86
(0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0033)
Log Country Credit Rating -0.0042 0.0113 0.0213 *** -0.0027 0.0094 0.0056 *** 73
(0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0018)
Panel B: Official Equity Market Liberalization
Capital Stock Growth Total Factor ProductivityTable 8. Financial openness and crises
Panel A: Growth Effects of a Crisis                                 
(5-year GDP growth)
Capital Account 
Openness
Official Equity 
Market 
Liberalization
78 96
Banking Crisis -0.0139 -0.0144
(0.0021) (0.0021)
Financial Openness 0.0143 0.0098
(0.0031) (0.0026)
Banking Crisis -0.0072 -0.0133
(0.0061) (0.0026)
Financial Openness 0.0157 0.0103
(0.0029) (0.0023)
Interaction -0.0125 -0.0035
(0.0090) (0.0049)
Panel B: Does Financial Openness 
Cause Crises? (Panel Probit on 5-
year Banking Crisis Indicator)
Coefficients
25th / 75th 
Percentiles Coefficients
25th / 75th 
Percentiles
Constant -11.9169 0.4334
(5.3138) (3.5361)
Initial GDP -0.5558 0.0804 -0.5049 0.0947
(0.2025) 0.0022 (0.1721) 0.0034
Secondary School -1.6592 0.0620 -0.6412 0.0400
(0.5434) 0.0075 (0.4544) 0.0177
Log(Life) 3.7308 0.0086 0.5513 0.0217
(1.3894) 0.0507 (0.9493) 0.0322
Trade/GDP 0.1698 0.0247 -0.0355 0.0289
(0.3087) 0.0289 (0.2756) 0.0279
Private credit/GDP 2.7581 0.0087 2.7493 0.0107
(0.3837) 0.1874 (0.3567) 0.1763
ICRG Political Risk Index -2.0385 0.0434 -2.1009 0.0451
(0.7151) 0.0131 (0.5766) 0.0147
Financial Openness -0.3546 0.0323 -0.0496 0.0285
(0.3010) 0.0214 (0.1287) 0.0254
73 86
Capital Account Openness
Official Equity Market 
Liberalization
In Panel A, the dependent variable is the overlapping five-year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP).  The regressions include the set of standard control variables employed in Table 1.  We report the coefficient on 
financial openness defined as (1) Quinn’s capital account openness indicator that takes a value between zero and one depending 
upon the intensity of the reported capital account openness and (2) the official liberalization indicator that takes a value of one 
when the equity market is liberalized, and zero otherwise.  We report the GDP growth effect associated with a contemporaneous 
banking sector crisis as identified by Caprio and Klingebiel, as well as an interaction effect between financial openness and 
banking sector crises.  Given data limitations, the capital account openness regressions include 78 countries and the official 
equity market liberalization regressions include 96 countries. We report coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions. The 
regression covers 1980-2006.  All standard errors (in parentheses) provide a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and 
account for the overlapping nature of the data.  In Panel B, the dependent variable in a panel probit estimation is a 0/1 indicator 
measuring the incidence of a banking sector crisis over the subsequent five-years.  We include the standard control variables, the 
ICRG’s measure of political risk, and our two measures of financial openness.  We report both the coefficient estimates and, in 
the second column, a measure of the economic significance of the effects.  In particular, we provide two specific predicted crisis 
probabilities where we  evaluate all the variables at their medians except the variable in question, which is evaluated at, 
respectively, the 25% and 75% percentiles in its overall distribution. 
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Figure 2. Log per capita GDP ratiosAppendix Table 1. Description of the variables
All data are employed at the annual frequency.
Variable Description
Gross domestic product (GDP) and its 
subcomponents
Real per capita gross domestic product. Available for all countries from 1980 through 2006. Source: World 
Bank Development Indicators.
Capital Stock and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) We build per capita physical capital stocks over the 1980–2006 period using the method in King and Levine 
(1994).  We derive an initial estimate of the capital stock, assuming each country is at its steady state capital-
output ratio at that time. Then, we use the aggregate real investment series and the perpetual inventory 
method with a depreciation rate of 7% to compute the capital stock in later years. TFP is calculated as the 
difference between the GDP growth rate and 0.3 times the capital stock growth rate, assuming a capital 
share of 0.3.
Measures of Financial Openness
Quinn Capital account liberalization indicator Quinn’s capital account openness measure is also created from the text of the annual volume published by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  Rather than 
the indicator constructed by the IMF that takes a 1 if any restriction is in place, Quinn’s openness measure is 
scored 0-4, in half integer units, with 4 representing a fully open economy.  The measure hence facilitates a 
more nuanced view of capital account openness, and is available for 48 countries in our study.  We 
transform the measure into a 0 to 1 scale.
Official equity market liberalization indicator Corresponding to a date of formal regulatory change after which foreign investors officially have the 
opportunity to invest in domestic equity securities. Official Liberalization dates are based on Bekaert and 
Harvey (2002) A Chronology of Important Financial, Economic and Political Events in Emerging Markets,  
http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/chronology.htm. This chronology is based on over 50 different source 
materials. A condensed version of the chronology, along with the selection of dates for a number of countries 
appears in Bekaert and Harvey (2000).  We have extended their official liberalization dates to include Japan, 
New Zealand, and Spain. For the liberalizing countries, the associated official liberalization indicator takes a 
value of one when the equity market is officially liberalized and thereafter, and zero otherwise.  For the 
remaining countries, fully segmented countries are assumed to have an indicator value of zero, and fully 
liberalized countries are assumed to have an indicator value of one.
Intensity equity market liberalization indicator Following Bekaert (1995) and Edison and Warnock (2003), the intensity measure is based on the ratio of the 
market capitalization of the constituent firms comprising the IFC Investable index to those that comprise the 
IFC Global index for each country.  The IFC Global index, subject to some exclusion restrictions, is designed 
to represent the overall market portfolio for each country, whereas the IFC Investable index is designed to 
represent a portfolio of domestic equities that are available to foreign investors.  A ratio of one means that all 
of the stocks are available to foreign investors.  Fully segmented countries have an intensity measure of zero, 
and fully liberalized countries have an intensity measure of one.
Macroeconomic and demographic measures
Initial GDP Logarithm of real per capita gross domestic product in 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, or 2000 for the subsequent 
five years.  Available for all countries. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Secondary School Enrollment Secondary school enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the 
age group that officially corresponds to the secondary level of education. Accordingly, the reported value can 
exceed (or average) more than 100%. Available for all countries. Source: World Bank Development 
Indicators.
Log life expectancy Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of 
mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.  Available for all countries. Source: 
World Bank Development Indicators.
Trade/GDP The trade dependency ratio is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of 
gross domestic product. Available for all countries. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Private credit/GDP Private credit divided by gross domestic product. Credit to private sector refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits 
and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.  Available for all countries. Source: 
World Bank Development Indicators.Appendix Table 1.
(Continued)
Variable Description
Illiquidity Following Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999), Lesmond (2005), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 
(2007), we construct the illiquidity measure as the proportion of zero daily returns observed over the 
relevant year for each equity market.  We obtain daily returns data in local currency at the firm level from 
the Datastream research files.  For each country, we observe daily returns (using closing prices) for a large 
collection of firms. The total number of firms available from the Datastream research files accounts for about 
90%, on average, of the number of domestically listed firms reported by the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators.  For each country, we calculate the capitalization-weighted proportion of zero daily 
returns across all firms, and average this proportion over the year. Available for 46 countries.
Equity market turnover The ratio of equity market value traded to the market capitalization.  The data are available for 51 countries. 
Source: Standard and Poor's/International Finance Corporation's Emerging Stock Markets Factbook.
MCAP/GDP The ratio of equity market capitalization to gross domestic product.  The data are available for 51 countries. 
Source: Standard and Poor's/International Finance Corporation's Emerging Stock Markets Factbook.
Price Inefficiency Equity market synchronicity as developed in Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000). The measure is an annual value-
weighted local market model R
2 obtained from each firm's returns regressed on the local market portfolio 
return for that year. Available for 47 countries.
Investment Profile ICRG political risk sub-component.  This is a measure of the government’s attitude to inward investment.  
The investment profile is determined by PRS's assessment of three sub-components: (i) risk of expropriation 
or contract viability; (ii) payment delays; and (iii) repatriation of profits.  Each sub-component is scored on a 
scale  from zero (very high risk) to four (very low risk).  Source: Various issues of the International 
Country Risk Guide.
Quality of Institutions The sum of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Political Risk subcomponents: Corruption, Law 
and Order, and Bureaucratic Quality. Source: Various issues of the International Country Risk Guide.
Law and Order ICRG political risk sub-component. ICRG assesses Law and Order separately, with each sub-component 
comprising zero to three points.  The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality 
of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law.  
Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating (3.0) in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating (1.0) if the law 
is ignored for a political aim.  Source: Various issues of the International Country Risk Guide
Macro-economic Environment The value of the the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) economic risk indicator (which ranges 
between 0 and 50).  The risk rating is a combination of 5 subcomponents: GDP levels and growth, 
respectively, inflation, balanced budgets, and the current account.  The minimum number of points for each 
component is zero, while the maximum number of points depends on the fixed weight that component is 
given in the overall economics risk assessment.  Source: Various issues of the International Country Risk 
Guide
Growth Opportunities Growth opportunities are global measures of country-specific growth opportunities.  Growth Opportunities 
are measured as the log of the inner product of the vector of global industry PE ratios and the vector of 
country-specific industry weights.  Country-specific industry weights are determined by relative equity 
market capitalization.  Then, a 60-month moving average is removed.  Available for 51 countries.  Source: 
Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2007)
Anti-director rights An index aggregating different shareholder rights. The index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country 
allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their 
shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of 
minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ 
Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median); or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights 
that can only be waved by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from 0 to 6. This variable is purely 
crosssectional, and available for 47 countries. Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
Political risk rating The political risk rating indicator which ranges between 0 (high risk) and 100 (low risk).  The risk rating is a 
combination of 12 subcomponents.  Source: Various issues of the International Country Risk Guide.Appendix Table 2. Summary statistics
All data are employed at the annual frequency.
GDP Growth
Capital Stock 
Growth
Productivity 
Growth
Productivity 
Growth (Alt.)
Log(Initial 
GDP)
Secondary 
School 
Enrollment
Log(Life 
Expectancy)
Mean 0.013 0.015 0.009 0.009 7.711 0.606 4.149
Median 0.018 0.013 0.014 0.014 7.548 0.570 4.220
Standard Deviation 0.046 0.029 0.043 0.039 1.616 0.342 0.196
No. of Countries 96 96 96 77 96 96 96
Trade/GDP
Private 
Credit/GDP
Capital Account 
Openness
Official Equity 
Market 
Liberalization
Log(Market 
Illiquidity) 
[Zero Returns] Turnover/GDP MCAP/GDP
Mean 0.725 0.466 0.625 0.429 -1.428 0.395 0.412
Median 0.614 0.312 0.625 0.000 -1.341 0.220 0.240
Standard Deviation 0.480 0.410 0.272 0.495 0.715 0.513 0.485
No. of Countries 96 96 78 96 47 73 73
Price 
Inefficiency
Investment 
Profile
Quality of 
Institutions Law and Order
Macro- 
economic 
Conditions
Log(Country 
Credit Rating)
Mean 0.227 0.586 0.579 0.615 0.632 3.671
Median 0.213 0.583 0.563 0.667 0.649 3.742
Standard Deviation 0.126 0.200 0.242 0.269 0.145 0.647
No. of Countries 46 86 86 86 86 73